Primary source:
sources/roechling/2026-08-01-polyproblem-08-wechsel-geld.md — the eighth
report in the POLYPROBLEM series of the Röchling Stiftung,
produced with Wider Sense GmbH. Editorial team: Marius Ehrlinspiel and Anna
Balzereit (Wider Sense); Uwe Amrhein, Nicole Bendsen, Christian Gerards
(Röchling Stiftung). 44 pages. The source file is a Markdown transcription
with explicit ## PDF-Seite N markers; page numbers in citations below refer
to those markers.
Why it was ingested
Handed over by Tell Münzing on 2026-11-03 as one of ten Röchling documents ahead of the Röchling Stiftung’s Foundation Camp on 2026-11-05, whose agenda is the financial-markets question. Martin Pompéry directed (2026-11-04) that the Röchling documents be ingested before any analysis. This report was taken first because it is the one the camp agenda is built on.
The report is a journalistic, interview-driven study, not a research paper: no method section, no dataset of its own. Its empirical weight comes from quantitative claims borrowed from EIB, Circle Economy, PREVENT Waste Alliance and BCG/BDI, plus twelve named interviews. Read it as a well-sourced map of what practitioners say, not as evidence in itself.
The central thesis, and its correction
The framing question is why capital does not flow: the EU invests roughly €120bn a year in the circular economy and would need about €1,229bn more by 2040 to meet its own climate targets (EIB 2026, p. 8 — cited p. 4).
Across all four actor chapters the answer given is not scarcity but steering. Marvin Nusseck (Circle Economy, Finance Programme): “Es mangelt nicht an Kapital, sondern an dessen Lenkung”; “Das zugrunde liegende Problem ist immer die Preisgestaltung von Ressourcen” (p. 27). Wolfgang Hafenmayer (Sagana / Circulate Capital): “Es gibt genug Geld” (p. 30).
The report then corrects its own opening thesis in one sentence that is the most useful line in it for SINE (p. 23):
“Die Eingangsthese bedarf also einer Ergänzung: Die größte Herausforderung besteht nicht nur darin, die Übergangszeit von der linearen Gegenwart in die zirkuläre Zukunft zu finanzieren. Es geht nicht minder darum, dies synchronisiert zu tun – unternehmensübergreifend und entlang der Wertschöpfungskette.”
Synchronised, cross-company, along the value chain: that is a coordination problem stated by a financing report in financing language. See coordination vs. bargaining failure and ecosystem financing.
What the document covers
Four actor chapters, then an interview with Frans Timmermans, then glossary, organisation list, interview list, bibliography.
1. Start-ups: pioneers without a safety net (pp. 4–19)
The financing gap sits between incubation and industrial scale — too large for micro-credit and small grants, too small and too risky for institutional investors (PREVENT 2025, p. 21 — cited p. 5). 60% of surveyed circular start-ups had financing applications rejected in the last two years; the reasons given are insufficient collateral, impact mismatch with the funder, and unclear business plans (PREVENT 2025, pp. 15–16 — cited p. 5). The report reads the third reason not as founder failure but as structural incompatibility: “Die Bewertungslogiken der Geldgeber sind auf lineare Geschäftsmodelle kalibriert, nicht auf zirkuläre” (p. 5).
Cases: Traceless (€36m round 2023, plant live spring 2026) could only raise bank debt once the Land Hamburg issued a guarantee — Anne Lamp’s co-founder Johanna Thoma: “Wenn das eine systemische Lücke ist, dann braucht es vielleicht auch eine systemische Lösung” (p. 15), with the report’s own comment that a scalable financing path must not depend on a political one-off. Anthropia Ventures (Oliver Kuschel, Duisburg) failed to close a €10m fund because the ~12% expected annual return was judged too low (p. 19).
2. Established companies: the circle as a product (pp. 20–26)
Three cases. Schwalbe built the first bicycle-tyre take-back system worldwide (2022; ~2.5m tyres collected by the time of writing) — “Recycling wird bei uns wie ein Produkt behandelt” (Holger Jahn, p. 22). The point the report draws from it: the value “entsteht nicht in einem einzelnen Unternehmen. Er entsteht in der Verbindung verschiedener Akteure”, each of which needs its own economic reason to stay in (p. 22).
PreZero / Schwarz Gruppe is the counter-case of buying your own loop: €3.9bn revenue FY2023/24, top-ten global waste company — and still loss-making, −€511m improving to −€386m in 2024 (EUWID, cited p. 23). The report’s verdict: “Das muss man sich auf lange Sicht erst einmal leisten können. … Kaum jemand hat diese Möglichkeiten” (pp. 22–23).
Pöppelmann reached ~50% recyclate (40pp PCR, 10pp PIR) and missed its own 2025 target of 60%/50%: “Wir sind erfolgreich gescheitert” (Benjamin Kampmann, p. 25). The bottleneck has moved from technology to raw-material supply, and Kampmann expects EU quotas from 2030 to raise recyclate demand faster than supply — pushing early movers back to virgin material (p. 25). ⟨Inference: an early-mover penalty created by a quota instrument is a measurable, dateable risk; it is the kind of claim a circularity data infrastructure could make visible in advance rather than in hindsight.⟩
From the Schwalbe and PreZero cases the report derives the question it leaves open (p. 23): “wie eine gemeinsame Infrastruktur finanziert und der daraus entstehende Wert verteilt wird” — who pays for take-back logistics, who profits from better-sortable packaging, who finances recycling capacity when recyclate demand fluctuates, and how firms that invest today are rewarded for benefits that only materialise in tomorrow’s working value chain. This is Martin’s question 4 (durable financing of data infrastructure), asked by the report itself and left unanswered. See data-space business models.
3. Financiers (pp. 27–35) — the chapter that matters most here
Nusseck / Circle Economy (pp. 27–28) — three distinct financier mandates (MDBs and public banks with patient capital and the strictest impact requirements; impact investors, more flexible, mission-aligned; commercial banks and institutional investors demanding proven cashflows, standardised metrics, established risk profiles). Circular firms fall between all three: “zu risikoreich für klassische Kreditgeber, zu kapitalintensiv für Venture Capital und zugleich noch nicht reif genug für großvolumige institutionelle Finanzierung – das berüchtigte Tal des Todes” (p. 27). Two structural diagnoses follow: the definition problem (“Es wird niemals eine wasserdichte Definition dafür geben, was zirkulär ist und was nicht”, p. 28) and the valuation gap (“Die Risikomodelle der Finanzierer sind für zirkuläre Geschäftsmodelle schlicht nicht ausgelegt”, p. 28).
Hafenmayer / Sagana & Circulate Capital (pp. 30–31) — the counter-voice. “Der Glaube an den grünen Bonus ist naiv”; “Nicht Nachhaltigkeit macht ein Unternehmen investierbar, sondern ein funktionierendes Geschäftsmodell”; “Von über 3.000 Innovationsunternehmern kann vielleicht ein Prozent erklären, wie sie in fünf Jahren wettbewerbsfähig werden wollen. Die meisten von ihnen sind reine Technologie-Freaks oder Öko-Träumer”; “Ohne Regulierung hast du keine Chance”; “Eine Recyclinglinie kostet fünf bis zehn Millionen Dollar.”
Gruber / DKB (pp. 32–33) — the single most SINE-relevant interview. A chicken-and-egg problem: without financing no track record, without track record no risk assessment. “Es gibt zu wenig Klarheit über die Geldströme und über die Werte, die dahinterstehen. Und damit gibt es in vielen Fällen zu wenig Klarheit über Risiken und erwartbaren Erlöse zirkulärer Geschäftsmodelle” (p. 32). Residual value is real but unbookable: “In einem zirkulären Bau haben Bauteile einen langfristigen Wert, den wir als Bank anders bilanzieren müssten, aber noch nicht können” (p. 32); the timing mismatch, “Ein zirkuläres Geschäftsmodell trägt oft erst nach zehn Jahren am meisten Früchte, während die Bank die Risiken am Anfang trägt” (p. 32). The bank names its own gap plainly — “Wir haben keine Circularity-Strategie und kein genuines Circularity-Produkt. Wir sind noch in der Phase des Aufschlauens” (p. 33) — and what would close it: “bessere Datengrundlagen und Standards”, specifically “digitale Gebäuderessourcenpässe”, which would make visible which materials are in a building and what they are worth long-term, “Erst dann könnten diese Werte auch in Finanzierungsentscheidungen berücksichtigt werden” (p. 33). On the state’s role: not new subsidies but “Standards, Dateninfrastrukturen, Förderprogramme und regulatorische Anreize. Der Staat hat unfassbar viele Instrumente in der Hand” (p. 33). The renewables analogy: the feed-in tariff removed the cashflow risk and made wind and solar bankable (p. 33). Closing line: “Wir stehen alle in den Startlöchern. Aber wir tun uns noch ein bisschen schwer mit dem Loslaufen.”
Betancourt Munoz / IDB Invest (pp. 34–35) — “Es ist nicht so, dass das Risiko verschwindet. Es ist einfach eine andere Art von Risiko” (p. 34). The obstacle is not capital supply but that “Märkte, Regulierungen und Finanzsysteme immer noch nicht wissen, wie zirkuläre Geschäftsmodelle richtig zu bewerten seien”. Most circular solutions are embedded in conventional sectors rather than being a category of their own (electric buses only become circular once battery reuse is in play). “Eines der fehlenden Elemente ist, wie man die verschiedenen Ökosysteme miteinander verbindet. … Wir müssen von einzelnen zirkulären Unternehmen zu einer echten Kreislaufwirtschaft kommen. Noch immer funktionieren viele dieser Projekte als isolierte Kreisläufe statt als Teil eines vollständig vernetzten zirkulären Ökosystems” (p. 34). Firms close the loop internally and then have no customers for the output (p. 34). What is needed: “koordinierte Ökosysteme, gemeinsame Standards und stärkere politische Rahmenbedingungen. Taxonomie ist eines der wichtigsten Themen … Das würde allen helfen, dieselbe Sprache zu sprechen”; “Zirkularität ist sehr schwierig, wenn niemand den großen Rahmen dafür schafft” (p. 35).
4. Politics (pp. 36–39) and the Stremlau interview (pp. 8–11)
Silke Stremlau on the EU taxonomy, the ministry silos, blended finance and the 90-10 rule — see her page. Frans Timmermans (pp. 37–39): the European capital union is “das Wichtigste, was wir für die Finanzierung der Kreislaufwirtschaft tun können”; ETS revenues should feed a Norway-style fund; the price gap between virgin material and recyclate has to shrink (p. 38).
Key quantitative claims (all second-hand)
| Claim | Figure | Source cited in the report |
|---|---|---|
| EU CE investment today / gap to 2040 | ~€120bn p.a. / +€1,229bn | EIB (2026), p. 8 — report p. 4 |
| Global commercial investment to CE, 2018–2023 | 2% | Circle Economy (2025), pp. 22f. — report p. 5 |
| Financial institutions naming CE an explicit focus | <5% of >1,200 | PREVENT (2025), p. 22 — report p. 5 |
| CE start-ups rejected for financing in two years | 60% | PREVENT (2025), p. 15 — report p. 5 |
| Annual value loss of the linear system | €25.4trn ≈ 31% of global GDP | Circle Economy (2026), p. 6 — report p. 4 |
| German environmental/health damage | 13–19% of GDP | Göpel (2025), pp. 166f. — report p. 4 |
| German CE gross value added by 2045 | could double to €125bn | BCG/BDI (2026), pp. 2f. — report p. 4 |
| VC supplied by pension funds, DE vs US | 0.2% vs ~6% | Stremlau interview — report p. 9 |
| PreZero result 2024 | −€386m (from −€511m) | EUWID — report p. 23 |
| Circular firms using bank credit as a financing source | 13% — vs 46% of European SMEs | PREVENT (2025), p. 12 — report p. 6 |
| Rabobank, “Circular Entrepreneurship Desk”, cumulative lending | €270m | PREVENT (2025), p. 27 — report p. 6 |
| Intesa Sanpaolo, circular projects made available in 2023 | €11.7bn, on its own CE methodology built with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation | PREVENT (2025), p. 27 — report p. 6 |
| Private funds with a circular-economy focus, 2016 → mid-2020 | tenfold increase | EMF (2020), p. 32 — report p. 6 |
| Circular-linked funds vs peers (at times) | +5 percentage points | EMF (2020), p. 15 — report p. 6 |
⟨Inference: the €1,229bn gap and the 2%-of-investment figure are the two numbers most likely to be quoted back at the camp; both are second-hand in this report, so cite EIB 2026 and Circle Economy 2025 directly if they carry weight in an argument.⟩
Nachtrag ⟨2026-11-06⟩ — accounting and financial innovation
Added after Tell Münzing’s note (Slack, 2026-11-06) that the first pass under-covered balance-sheet mechanics and financial innovation. Nothing below revises the summary above; it fills in the instrument layer the report actually documents.
SINE’s reading first. The report treats “financing the circular economy” as one problem. It is two. One is an accounting problem — a value that exists physically has no line in any ledger, so no risk model can price it. The other is an instrument problem — even where the value is admitted, the standard credit product has the wrong duration and the wrong collateral. The report’s own evidence shows these are solved at different speeds: the instrument problem is already being solved privately by a handful of banks, while the accounting problem is solved nowhere. That asymmetry is the finding; it is also why standards and data infrastructure, not capital, are the binding constraint. See circular ecosystem maturity stages.
What does not get booked
Gruber’s chapter carries the report’s own heading for this: “Der Wert, den niemand bilanziert” (p. 32). The mechanism, in the report’s words: banks assess risk “anhand jahrzehntelanger Erfahrungswerte, standardisierter Bewertungsverfahren und klar nachvollziehbarer Cashflows” — and circular models supply none of the three (p. 32). A circular building contains materials with a real future residual value; “Im derzeitigen Finanzsystem spielt dieser jedoch kaum eine Rolle” (p. 32). Gruber’s diagnosis is explicitly a valuation-logic failure, not a willingness failure: the financing of the circular economy “scheitere derzeit an den Bewertungs- und Risikologiken, nach denen Kapital vergeben wird” (p. 32).
Two consequences the report states but does not connect:
- The duration mismatch sits on the wrong side of the balance sheet. “Ein zirkuläres Geschäftsmodell trägt oft erst nach zehn Jahren am meisten Früchte, während die Bank die Risiken am Anfang trägt” (p. 32). Classical financing rests on “kurzfristig nachweisbaren Sicherheiten und bekannten Marktpreisen” (p. 32) — so the asset that would close the gap (residual value in ten years) is precisely the one the instrument cannot see.
- Switching the model changes the balance sheet before it changes the product. “Denn zirkuläre Geschäftsmodelle verändern nicht nur Produkte, sondern auch Bilanzen. Wer umstellt und Produkte verleiht statt verkauft … braucht Vorabinvestitionen, bevor die neuen Ertragslogiken greifen” (p. 6, citing EMF 2020, p. 35) — against “ein System, das Gewinne jedes Quartal messen möchte” (p. 6).
⟨Inference: this is the same object as residual-value grading and the digital product passport, seen from the lender’s side. A Gebäuderessourcenpass is not a transparency instrument here — it is a bookkeeping instrument. Gruber says so: only with it “könnten diese Werte auch in Finanzierungsentscheidungen berücksichtigt werden” (p. 33).⟩
The instruments that already exist
The report documents more financial innovation than its own pessimistic framing suggests — and all of it sits outside the standard product shelf:
| Instrument | Evidence in the report | What it substitutes for |
|---|---|---|
| Proprietary bank CE methodology | Intesa Sanpaolo, €11.7bn in 2023, assessed with a methodology built with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (p. 6) | a missing public standard — the bank builds its own |
| Dedicated desk / in-house expertise | Rabobank “Circular Entrepreneurship Desk”, €270m lent (p. 6) | a missing risk model — expertise instead of a rating |
| Blended finance with first-loss tranches | Stremlau: public first-loss tranches “damit privates Kapital überhaupt investiert” (p. 10) | a missing track record |
| The 90-10 rule as an expectation corrector | ”90 Prozent der Transformationsfinanzierungen stammen aus privater Hand … nur zehn Prozent vom Staat. Oft wird so getan, als müsse der Staat alles finanzieren, das stimmt nicht” (p. 10) | the subsidy reflex |
| Green-loan books with embedded steering | banks with “Nachhaltigkeitsindikatoren schon in der Steuerung”, growth via green bonds (p. 10) | — the circular version does not exist yet |
| Demand-side guarantee (feed-in-tariff analogue) | Gruber on renewables: the Einspeisevergütung removed the cashflow risk and made wind and solar bankable (p. 33) | a missing offtake market |
| Industry offtake guarantee / earmarked levy | not in 08 — in POLYPROBLEM 06 | — |
Note what the first two rows share: both pioneering banks built their own valuation methodology privately, because no public one exists. Intesa’s is EMF-built; Rabobank’s is embodied in a desk rather than a document. Neither is interoperable with the other.
⟨Inference: this is the strongest single argument in the report for a shared methodology layer, and the report does not make it. Two banks each paying to build a private CE assessment is a textbook duplicated-fixed-cost problem — cheaper as shared infrastructure, and nobody has an incentive to build it alone. It is the financing-side twin of the coordination failure on the data side.⟩
Why the taxonomy did not do this job
Stremlau’s critique (p. 10) is the report’s clearest account of a standard that exists and still does not steer capital:
“Man hatte sich erhofft, dass es durch die Taxonomie-Kriterien eine Erleichterung, z. B. für Investitionen in die Circular Economy, gibt. Doch die Taxonomie ist zu komplex. Sie beschreibt den Goldstandard für nachhaltige Wirtschaftsaktivitäten, also einen kleinen Teil der Wirtschaft, aber nicht die breite Masse. Dadurch hat sie keine echte Steuerungsfunktion. Banken erheben die Daten, nutzen sie aber kaum aktiv. Ich hätte eher definiert, was nicht nachhaltig ist, und das regulatorisch stärker gewichtet.”
Three distinct failure modes in one paragraph: coverage (gold standard → a small share of the economy), usage (data collected, not used), and polarity (a positive list instead of a negative list). Stremlau also disputes the risk premium itself — green investments show “kein höheres Ausfallrisiko und oft ein besseres Risiko-Rendite-Verhältnis”, and circular models are “langfristig … stabiler, gerade mit Blick auf geopolitische Risiken” (p. 10).
Contradiction, left standing: Stremlau says the risk is misestimated (the models are wrong about a known risk); Betancourt Munoz says “Es ist nicht so, dass das Risiko verschwindet. Es ist einfach eine andere Art von Risiko” (p. 34) — a different risk object, not a mis-set parameter. The two imply different fixes: better calibration vs. a new risk category. The report prints both without noticing.
⟨Inference: SINE’s position is Betancourt’s. If it were only calibration, the 13%/46% gap would close as data accumulated; it has not. A different risk object needs a different observable — which is a data-infrastructure requirement, not a disclosure requirement.⟩
Where venture capital structurally cannot help
“Der ausschließliche Kreislaufwirtschaftsfokus ist rar in der Venture-Capital-Welt” (p. 6). VC prefers “Asset-Light-Modelle” — digital marketplaces, licence-based models — “Infrastruktur ist jedoch für funktionierende Kreislaufsysteme unerlässlich” (p. 6). Against this, the headline fund numbers look better than they are: CE-focused private funds grew tenfold 2016 → mid-2020 and at times outperformed peers by five percentage points (p. 6, EMF 2020) — growth in a category that systematically avoids the capital-intensive part of the problem.
The bank channel is where the gap bites: only 13% of the surveyed private circular firms use bank credit, against 46% of European SMEs (p. 6, PREVENT 2025, p. 12). And the investor quoted in the PREVENT study names the unit error directly: “Wir müssen anfangen, über die Finanzierung des Systems nachzudenken, anstatt einzelne Akteure innerhalb des Systems zu finanzieren” (p. 6).
Nachtrag ⟨2026-11-06⟩ — the value chain as the unit of ecosystem development
SINE’s reading first. Every actor in this report who has actually built something describes the same thing: the value is created between firms, and every instrument is scoped to a firm. That is not a financing gap — it is a unit-of-account mismatch. The transition does not fail at the company level; it fails at the seam between companies, which is exactly where neither a balance sheet nor a credit agreement reaches.
Schwalbe is the report’s worked example (p. 22): the first bicycle-tyre take-back system worldwide, ~2.5m tyres collected. The report’s own conclusion from it is explicit — the value “entsteht nicht in einem einzelnen Unternehmen. Er entsteht in der Verbindung verschiedener Akteure”, and each of them needs its own economic reason to stay in (p. 22). Collector, logistics, recycler and manufacturer each hold one link; none of them can book the chain.
Stammer / TecPart (p. 24) says the same from the association’s vantage point, and adds what the single case cannot show:
- The transition is evolutionary, not greenfield. “Die meisten bauen kein völlig neues Geschäft auf der grünen Wiese. Sie erweitern ihr bestehendes Geschäft Schritt für Schritt … eher Evolution als Revolution.”
- Two time horizons at once. “Langfristig wissen viele Unternehmen, dass Kreislaufwirtschaft notwendig ist. Kurzfristig stehen jedoch Auftragslage, Kosten und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit im Fokus. Wer um seine Auslastung kämpft, investiert vorsichtiger in neue Strukturen.”
- Size determines the financing route. Mittelständler finance circular projects “meist aus dem laufenden Geschäft heraus”; large firms “können strategischer vorgehen, gezielt Kapital aufnehmen und ganze Recycling- oder Rücknahmesysteme aufbauen.”
- The collaboration requirement is new. “Früher reichte es oft, Material einzukaufen und Produkte zu verkaufen. Heute müssen Verarbeiter, Kunden, Recycler und Rohstofflieferanten viel enger zusammenarbeiten. Kreislaufwirtschaft entsteht nicht in einem Unternehmen, sondern entlang der gesamten Wertschöpfungskette.”
- What firms ask for is not money. “Klarheit. … Wer weiß, welche Regeln und Quoten in fünf oder zehn Jahren gelten, kann investieren. Unsicherheit ist oft ein größeres Hindernis als die eigentliche Transformation.”
Betancourt Munoz states the same problem at the level of whole markets: “Eines der fehlenden Elemente ist, wie man die verschiedenen Ökosysteme miteinander verbindet. … Noch immer funktionieren viele dieser Projekte als isolierte Kreisläufe statt als Teil eines vollständig vernetzten zirkulären Ökosystems” (p. 34) — firms close the loop internally and then find no customer for the output.
And the report asks the distribution question itself, then leaves it open (p. 23): “wie eine gemeinsame Infrastruktur finanziert und der daraus entstehende Wert verteilt wird.”
⟨Inference: three voices, three scales — one chain (Schwalbe), one sector (Stammer), one market system (Betancourt) — converging on the same structural fact: the cost-bearer is not the value-captor, and no instrument in the report operates across that boundary. Stammer’s “Klarheit” answer identifies which instrument class would: not capital, but a credible forward commitment that lets each link compute its own return. That is the bootstrapping problem in its financing form, and the reason the maturity ladder’s S2→S3 transition — from bilateral underwriting to multilateral synchronisation — has no financing pattern behind it.⟩
What this source does not contain
Checked explicitly against Martin’s five questions (2026-11-04):
- Nothing on antitrust, IP or governance of joint learning between competitors. The word Kartellrecht does not appear. The report repeatedly demands cross-company coordination without once asking whether it is legal.
- Nothing on rebound effects or additionality. Circularity impact is assumed, never measured; there is no discussion of how to show that a circular investment saved resources that would not otherwise have been saved.
- Nothing on verification mechanisms for data quality. Gruber demands “bessere Datengrundlagen und Standards” and stops there — no treatment of how data would be made trustworthy across firm boundaries, which is exactly where PACT-style data-quality verification and decision-grade criteria start.
These three absences are the gaps, and they are gaps in the camp’s own agenda document, not just in the wiki.
Cross-references
- Der Circularity Code (POLYPROBLEM 06, 2023) — ⟨added 2026-11-06⟩ the same publisher, three years earlier, on the data side. 08 asks why capital does not flow; 06 already answered part of it from the operating side — “Die Technik ist vorhanden, das Geschäftsmodell nicht” — and names two instruments 08 does not list (industry offtake guarantees, an earmarked single-use levy). Neither report cites the other.
- Circularity valuation gap — the Gruber/Nusseck diagnosis as a concept page.
- Circular ecosystem maturity stages — ⟨added 2026-11-06⟩ SINE-authored ladder built from 06+07+08 read as one set; it is where this report’s unreconciled financier voices (Nusseck vs. Hafenmayer vs. Betancourt) are placed against each other.
- Circularity definition problem
- Ecosystem financing
- Residual-value grading — the lender-side corroboration.
- Digital product passport — Gebäuderessourcenpass as a bank-side demand.
- Circular Value-added Productivity — Hitachi/AIST’s indicator work is an answer to the definition problem this report states from the European side.
- Data-space business models — the report’s unanswered “who finances shared infrastructure”.
- Coordination vs. bargaining failure
- Röchling Stiftung, Circle Economy, Silke Stremlau
Interviewees (report pp. 42)
Oliver Kuschel (Anthropia) · Marvin Nusseck (Circle Economy) · Axel Kaiser (Denttabs) · Andreas Gruber (DKB, CSO) · Silke Stremlau (Finance for Transition) · Frans Timmermans · Marcela Betancourt Munoz (IDB Invest) · Karsten Hirsch (Plastic Fischer) · Benjamin Kampmann (Pöppelmann) · Wolfgang Hafenmayer (Sagana & Circulate Capital) · Frank Stammer (TecPart)